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Abstract. – We introduce nonlinear attractive effects into a spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game
where the players located on a square lattice can either cooperate with their nearest neighbors
or defect. In every generation, each player updates its strategy by firstly choosing one of the
neighbors with a probability proportional to Aα denoting the attractiveness of the neighbor,
where A is the payoff collected by it and α (≥0) is a free parameter characterizing the extent of
the nonlinear effect; and then adopting its strategy with a probability dependent on their payoff
difference. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we investigate the density ρC of cooperators in the
stationary state for different values of α. It is shown that the introduction of such attractive
effect remarkably promotes the emergence and persistence of cooperation over a wide range of
the temptation to defect. In particular, for large values of α, i.e., strong nonlinear attractive
effects, the system exhibits two absorbing states (all cooperators or all defectors) separated
by an active state (coexistence of cooperators and defectors) when varying the temptation to
defect. In the critical region where ρC goes to zero, the extinction behavior is power law-
like ρC ∼ (bc − b)
β, where the exponent β accords approximatively with the critical exponent
(β ≈ 0.584) of the two-dimensional directed percolation and depends weakly on the value of α.
Introduction. – Cooperation plays an important role in real world, ranging from biological
systems to economic and social systems [1]. Scientists from many different fields of natural
and social sciences often resort to Evolutionary Game Theory [2,3] as a common mathematical
framework and the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) as a metaphor for studying cooperation
between unrelated individuals [3]. The original PDG describes the pairwise interactions of
individuals with two behavioral options: the two players must simultaneously decide whether
to cooperate or to defect. For mutual cooperation both players receive the rewards R, but
only the punishment P for mutual defection. A defector exploiting a cooperator gets an
amount T (temptation to defect) and the exploited cooperator receives S (sucker’s payoff).
These elements satisfy the following two conditions: T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S. It is
easy to see that defection is the better choice irrespective of the opponent’s decision. Thus,
the undesired outcome of mutual defection emerges in well-mixed populations [4], which has
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Fig. 1 – (color online). Monte Carlo results (a) and theoretical analysis (b) for cooperator density ρC
in the steady state as a function of the temptation to defect b for several different values of α (see
the plot). The pair-approximation correctly predicts the trends that ρC changes with b and α, but
significantly overestimates the extinction thresholds in contrast to the simulation results (see the text
for details).
inspired numerous investigations of suitable extensions that enable cooperative behavior to
emerge and persist.
Some previous works have suggested several mechanisms (e.g., kin selection [5], the in-
troduction of “tit-for-tat” [6, 7] strategy, and voluntary participation [8–10]) to facilitate the
emergence and persistence of cooperation in the populations. The spatial versions [11, 12] of
the evolutionary PDGs can explain the maintenance of cooperation for the iterated games
with a limited range of interaction if the players follow one of the two simplest strategies
(defection (D) and cooperation (C)). Recently, the effect of heterogeneous influence of dif-
ferent individuals on the maintenance of cooperative behavior has been studied on regular
small-world networks [13]. Ren et al. have studied the evolutionary PDG and the snowdrift
game with preferential learning mechanism on the Baraba´si-Albert networks [14]. In the evo-
lutionary games the players wish to maximize their total payoffs, coming from PDGs with the
neighbors, by adopting either the deterministic rule introduced by Nowak and May [11,15] or
the stochastic evolutionary rule by Szabo´ and To˝ke [16].
In the present work, we make further studies of the evolutionary PDG on square lattice
mainly according to the stochastic update rule. It is natural to consider that different individ-
uals may have different attractiveness in social systems, so when updating their strategies, the
individuals may not completely randomly choose a neighbor to refer to. Here, we introduce
the nonlinear attractive effect into the game (see the model below). Interestingly, we find that
the introduction of this effect can remarkably promote cooperative behavior in the PDG in
comparison with the random choice case on square lattice.
The model. – We consider the evolutionary PDG on square lattice with periodic bound-
ary conditions. Each player interacts only with its four nearest neighbors (self-interaction
is excluded) [17], and collects payoffs dependent on the payoff-matrix parameters. The to-
tal payoff of a certain player is the sum over all its interactions. We have inspected that if
every player interacts with its first and second nearest neighbors or the self-interactions are
Jian-Yue Guan, Zhi-Xi Wu, Zi-Gang Huang, Xin-Jian Xu and Ying-Hai Wang:Promotion of cooperation induced by nonlinear attractive effect in spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game3
   
   
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Fig. 2 – A series of snapshots of typical distributions of cooperators (white) and defectors (black) on
square lattice for b = 1.283 (the value just below the extinction threshold bc1 ≈ 1.284 when α = 1)
for several different values of α: (a) α = 0, (b) α = 1, (c) α = 2, (d) α = 5, (e) α = 8, (f) α = 10.
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Fig. 3 – Log-log plots of the average cooperator density ρC as a function of the distance to the
extinction threshold bcα − b for several values of α: (a) α = 1, bc1 ≈ 1.284, (b) α = 2, bc2 ≈ 1.407,
(c) α = 3, bc3 ≈ 1.453, (d) α = 5, bc5 ≈ 1.518, (e) α = 8, bc8 ≈ 1.603, (f) α = 10, bc10 ≈ 1.646. The
solid lines, the power laws ∼ (bcα − b)
βα fit the data correspondence with the exponents of βα (the
detailed values are given in the plots, where the figures between parentheses indicate the statistical
uncertainties of the last digit).
4 EUROPHYSICS LETTERS
0 2 4 6 8 10
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
0 2 4 6 8 10
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
 
 
I c
 
 
b c
Fig. 4 – . The extinction threshold bcα changes with α (from zero to ten). Inset shows that the
increment Icα of the extinction threshold bcα changes with α (see the text).
included, the qualitative results are unchanged. Following common practices [15,16], we start
by rescaling the game to make T = b, R = 1, and P = S = 0, where b represents the advantage
of defectors over cooperators [15], being typically constrained to the interval 1.0 < b < 2.0,
such that it depends on a single parameter b. We have checked that the qualitative results do
not change if we make S = −ǫ < 0(ǫ≪ 1) in order to strictly enforce a PD setting.
During the evolutionary process, each player is allowed to select one of its neighbors as a
reference with a probability proportional to the neighbors’ attractiveness, and then decides
whether to change its strategy or not dependent on their payoff difference. We define the
selection probability Px→y of x selecting a neighbor y as
Px→y =
Aαy∑
z∈Ωx
Aαz
, (1)
where the numerator denotes the attractiveness of the neighbor y, and α is a tunable parameter
describing the extent of the nonlinear effect, and Ay is the total payoff of that neighbor.
The denominator is the sum of attractiveness that runs over all neighbors of x. The basic
ingredient which determines the choice of one neighbor is the selection kernel Aα. On general
grounds, this selection kernel should be a nondecreasing function of A, namely individuals
with better performance may have much stronger attractiveness than the average individual.
We note that the selection probability depends only on the extent of a nonlinear effect α since
the total payoff collected by any player satisfies A ≥ 0 in the present model. Thus we will
consider the model with α ∈ [0,∞). For α = 0, the neighbor is randomly selected so that the
game is reduced to the original one in Refs. [16,17]. The case α = 1 leads to the proportional
selection rule (exclude the player itself) [18]. While in the limit of α→∞, the neighbor whose
payoff is the highest among the neighbors is selected, which resembles to the deterministic
selection rule [11,15]. For other values of α, the attractiveness of the neighbors is a nonlinear
function of their total payoffs. In this way, we consider the general situations of the nonlinear
attractive effect on the dynamical behavior of the game.
The player x adopts the selected y neighbor’s strategy in the next round with a probability
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depending on their total payoff difference presented in Ref. [16, 17, 19, 20] as
W (x← y) =
1
1 + exp[(Ax −Ay)/κ]
, (2)
where Ax, Ay denote the total payoffs of individuals x and y respectively, and κ characterizes
the noise effects, including fluctuations in payoffs, errors in decision, individual trials, etc.
The effect of noise has been reported by Szabo´ et al. [20]. In this paper, we make κ = 0.1.
Qualitatively, the results remain unaffected when changing the parameter κ.
Simulations and analysis. – Simulations were carried out for a population of N = 400×
400 individuals. We study the key quantity of cooperator density ρC in the steady state.
Initially, the two strategies of C and D are randomly distributed among the individuals with
equal probability 1/2. The above model was simulated with synchronous updating [21]. No
qualitative changes occur if we adopt an asynchronous updating [16]. Eventually, the system
reaches a dynamic equilibrium state. The simulation results were obtained by averaging over
the last 5000 Monte Carlo time steps of the total 50000.
Fig. 1 shows the results of both simulations and theoretical analysis of ρC when increasing
b for several different values of α (see the plot). We can find that, compared with the well-
mixed situation, if b is sufficiently small, cooperators can persist in spatial settings in the case
of α = 0, which indicates that spatial structure can promote cooperation [15]. For b > bc0
(≈ 1.0217), where bc0 is the extinction threshold of cooperators when α = 0, the benefits of
spatial clustering are no longer sufficient to offset the losses along the boundary, hence the
cooperators vanish [17]. For each positive value of α, the system evolves to the absorbing
state of all defectors at certain values of b. The extinction threshold of cooperators bcα clearly
increases with α, which indicates that the emergence of cooperation is enhanced.
We know that cooperators survive by forming compact clusters and thus cooperators along
the boundary can outweigh their losses against defectors by gains from interactions within the
cluster [17]. The payoffs collected by the inner cooperators are, in most cases, larger than
the boundary defectors. When considering the attractiveness of the individuals, near the ex-
tinction threshold, for cooperator-clusters which are surrounded by defectors, the cooperators
along the boundary can keep their cooperative states more easily under stronger preferential
selection effect according to the dynamic updating Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). Thus the strong
attractiveness of individuals can favor the spreading of cooperators, hence promote the per-
sistence of cooperation. We can also see that, for very large α, the homogeneous cooperation
state (ρC = 1) emerges when b is very small. Since both the small temptation to defect and
the strong nonlinear attractive effect are advantageous to the persistence of cooperation, it is
not surprising that ρC approaches the maximal fraction 1. Moreover, for the same value of
b, ρC obviously increases with α. The existence of strong nonlinear effect can facilitate the
formation of cooperator clusters, hence enhance the persistence of cooperators (see Fig. 2).
In addition, the cooperator density ρC and the extinction thresholds bcα change more slowly
with increasing α. We will consider this point in the following. The pair approximation
method, which models the frequency of strategy pairs rather than that of strategies, is usually
regarded as an analytical approximation of the spatial dynamics [17]. It is worth noting that
the results obtained by pair approximation are directly associated with the local topological
structure of the players and the strategy updating dynamics. Whether the strategy updating
is implemented synchronously or asynchronously is inessential [21]. Therefore we can apply
the pair approximation method to predict qualitatively the evolving behavior of ρC . Here we
modify the original method by introducing the turnable parameter α, i.e., we substitute the
new transition probability f ′(PB − PA) for the original transition probability f(PB − PA) in
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Eq. (A1) in ref.[18], where f ′(PB − PA) = f(PB − PA)
Pα
B∑
Pα
B
and the denominator of the
fraction denotes the sum of all possible values of PαB when α is certain. Then we adjust the
Eq. (A2a) and Eq. (A2b) in ref. [17] by substituting f ′ for f . The equilibrium values are ob-
tained by numerical integration. We can see from Fig. 1 that the pair approximation correctly
predicts the trends, that is, the changes of cooperation for b and α. However, it is unable to
estimate exactly the extinction thresholds of cooperator density, namely, it overestimates the
extinction thresholds (see the plot).
A series of snapshots for several different values of α are shown in Fig. 2 for the same
value of b.These snapshots are a 120× 120 portion of the full 400× 400 lattice. We can find
that, for random selection case α = 0, cooperators are doomed and defectors reign because
the value b = 1.283 is larger than bc0 ≈ 1.0217 (Fig. 2(a)). But for α = 1, when b is just below
bc1, the cooperators can survive by forming compact clusters which minimize the exploitation
by defectors (see Fig. 2(b)). For larger α, i.e., stronger nonlinear attractive effect, more co-
operator clusters emerge, which illustrates that cooperators can survive against the invading
of defectors more easily. On the contrary, the defector clusters decrease with the value of α.
Interestingly, the spatial patterns adopted by defectors are completely different from that of
cooperators when they are the minority in the populations. As shown in Fig. 2 (f), defectors
exist in the fashion of zigzag pattern (or step-like). Because if defector clusters are surrounded
by cooperators, in the subsequent generations, the defectors along the boundary would trans-
form probably to cooperators according to the selection rule with nonlinear attractive effects
Eq. (1) and updating rule Eq. (2). Eventually, defectors exist in zigzag pattern from which
they can benefit maximumly when interacting with their cooperator neighbors (even can do
better than a cooperator surrounded by four cooperators, so that when updating, they “al-
ways”ask their defector neighbors for strategy transformation), which in return makes the
zigzag pattern stably in the evolution of the game.
We also investigate the divergence behaviors of cooperators near the extinction thresholds
bcα for several values of α (see Fig. 3). We constrained the system size as 800×800 individuals
and the results were obtained by averaging over the last 10000 time steps of the total 150000.
According to our simulations, near bcα the average fraction of cooperators vanishes as power-
law like behavior ρc ∼ (bcα−b)
βα , where βα are a set of exponents corresponding with the value
of α (see the plots for detailed values). In physics, such thresholds are usually associated with
phase transitions, and indeed, the transitions from persistent levels of cooperation (b < bcα)
to absorbing states of defection (b > bcα) bear the hallmarks of critical phase transitions.
These values of βα are nearly consistent with the critical exponent (β ≈ 0.584) of the two-
dimensional directed percolation [22] and depend weakly on α. The estimated errors of β1,
β2, β3, β5, β8, β10 are 0.019, 0.133, 0.072, 0.068, 0.053, 0.033 respectively. We consider that the
large errors are due to the limits of computational conditions.
The variation of extinction threshold bcα with the value of α (from zero to ten) is shown in
Fig. 4. We can see that the extinction threshold clearly increases with the value of α. Now we
define a quantity characterizing the increment of the extinction threshold as Icα = bcα−bc(α−1).
We note that this quantity decreases with the value of α (inset in Fig. 4). This indicates
that, as α→∞, the increment Icα will approach to the minimal value 0. In other words, the
extinction threshold bcα will tend towards the maximal value bc∞, where bc∞ ≈ 1.995 is the
extinction threshold when α →∞, i.e., when the neighbor whose payoff is the highest of the
neighboring is selected to refer to.
Conclusions. – In summary, we have investigated the promotion of cooperation in the
context of evolutionary PDG resulting from the nonlinear attractive effect of the neighbors on
square lattice. A nonlinear function Aα, in terms of the performance of the players, is used
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as an estimator of their attractiveness. We have considered the general situations and shown
that, compared with the random selection case, the introduction of the nonlinear attractive
effect can remarkably promote the cooperative behavior over a wide range of b. Particularly,
the stronger the extent of the nonlinear effect is, the more prominent the cooperative behavior
will be, and for some large α values, a homogeneous state of all cooperators can emerge. In-
terestingly, the spatial patterns adopted by cooperators and defectors are completely different
when they are the minority in the populations: Cooperators can survive by forming compact
clusters, and along the boundary, cooperators can outweigh their losses against defectors by
gains from interactions within the cluster; Whereas defectors exist in the way of zigzag pattern
(or step-like), from which defectors can benefit maximumly when interacting with their coop-
erator neighbors. The extinction of cooperators under harsh conditions when b→ bcα displays
a power law-like behavior ρC ∼ (bcα− b)
β . The introduction of the nonlinear attractive effect
can partially resolve the dilemma of cooperation and may shed new lights on the evolution of
cooperation in the society.
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